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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Antonio Ruiz appeals, alleging the district court erred in ruling on several pre-
and post- trial motions. He also contends that there were two inappropriate comments 
made during his trial, one by the district court judge and one by the prosecutor, both of 
which constitute fundamental error. Finally, he asserts that, even if these errors are 
individually harmless, cumulatively, they show the deprivation of his right to a fair trial. 
The State raises various points in response to these arguments. None are persuasive. 
Therefore, for any and all of those reasons, this Court should vacate Mr. Ruiz's 
conviction and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Ruiz's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Ruiz's motion for new trial 
since Dr. McPherson had improperly been allowed to testify as a rebuttal expert 
witness even though the State did not comply with the discovery rules. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Ruiz's motion to dismiss the 
indictment even though the indictment omitted an essential element of the 
offense. 
3. Whether the district court erroneously allowed the State to present evidence of 
other bad acts even though the State did not serve timely notice pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b). 
4. Whether the district court made an impermissible comment on the evidence, that 
one of the elements of the offense would be "quite obvious" from the prosecutor's 
evidence. 
5. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in both voir dire and closing 
argument by misstating the law and lowering the State's burden of proof by 
arguing that there was no mens rea requirement associated with a charge of 
injury to a child. 
6. Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even if this Court 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ruiz's Motion For New Trial Since 
Dr. McPherson Had Improperly Been Allowed To Testify As A Rebuttal Expert Witness 
Even Though The State Did Not Comply With The Discovery Rules 
A. The State's Disclosure Was Not Sufficient Under The Rules 
1. The State's Arguments, Which Do Not Address The Due Process 
Concerns At Issue In This Case, Effectively Concede That A Due Process 
Violation Occurred 
As an initial matter, the State does not address the due process issue caused by 
its failure to disclose Dr. McPherson's report. (See App. Br., pp.7-9; see generally 
Resp. Br.) This is particularly problematic because the State admits the purpose of 
calling Dr. McPherson was specifically to rebut the opinions given by Dr. Friedman. 
(Resp. Br., p.13.) Because the State required Mr. Ruiz to disclose Dr. Friedman's 
opinions pretrial pursuant to I.C.R. 16(c)(4) (R., Vol.2, pp251-52), due process required 
the State to disclose Dr. McPherson's responsive opinions pretrial. Wardius v. Oregon, 
412 U.S. 470,476 (1973). 
The only disclosure the State made was that Dr. McPherson would rely on 
Ms. Guzman's report. (See R., Vol.2, pp.264-65.) However, Ms. Guzman's report does 
not identify any opinions in regard to Dr. Friedman's conclusions, nor does it cite any 
reports or data which would be used to contradict Dr. Friedman's opinions. (See 
generally PSI attachment, pp.68-79 (CARES interview summary report and 
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evaluation).)1 That is not surprising because Ms. Guzman's report was prepared before 
Friedman had been retained on this case. (Compare PSI attachment, p.68 
(Ms. Guzman's report dated August 22, 2013); with R , pp.81-82 (order appointing 
Dr. Friedman as a defense expert dated December 18, 2013).) As such, there is 
nothing in the State's pretrial disclosure of Ms. Guzman's report which would provide 
the necessary description of Dr. McPherson's opinions intended to refute 
Dr. Friedman's opinions, much less the facts and data upon which such opinions were 
based. See I.C.R. 16(b)(7) (requiring that, when the defendant requests it, the State is 
required to disclose "[a description of) the witness's opinions, the facts and data for 
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications"). 
Thus, by conceding Dr. McPherson was called to refute Dr. Friedman's 
testimony, and since there was no pretrial disclosure of Dr. McPherson's responsive 
opinions, the State has effectively conceded the Wardius due process violation occurred 
in this case. On that basis alone, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand 
the case. (See App. Br., pp.7-8.) 
2. Disclosing Ms. Guzman's Report Was Not Sufficient Disclosure For The 
Opinions Dr. McPherson Ultimately Gave - The State Needed To Disclose 
Dr. McPherson's Own Report 
All the State argues on the disclosure issue is that, by disclosing Ms. Guzman's 
report and asserting Dr. McPherson would rely on that report for his opinions, the State 
made a sufficient disclosure. (Resp. Br., pp.5-9.) However, beside the shortcoming 
discussed in Section A(1 ), supra, Mr. Guzman's report was not a sufficient basis for 
1 The page numbers on this attachment appear to be from another collation of 
information, not the PSI itself. 
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Dr. McPherson's opinions Only he was competent to say what his opinions were and 
upon what facts and data he based his opinions. Thus, the State needed to disclose 
McPherson's own report of his opinions. Without such a report, the district court did 
not have sufficient information to conduct the necessary preliminary assessment of the 
purported expert testimony as required by I.R.E. 702. (See App. Br., p.8.) Furthermore, 
the State's other point in this regard - because Mr. Ruiz did not object to Ms. Guzman's 
testimony as an expert witness, there was no error in allowing Dr. McPherson to testify 
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10) - is a non sequitur, and so, erroneous. The fact that the State 
presented another expert's testimony does not reveal that the testimony of a second 
expert was proper. Thus, the State's contention on appeal that the pretrial disclosure 
was sufficient is shown to be erroneous. 
In fact, the State's concession about the State's intent to call Dr. McPherson to 
rebut Dr. Friedman's testimony (Resp. Br .. p.7) actually shows the error under the plain 
language of I.C.R. 16(b)(7). The State contends that the rebuttal provision of 
!.C.R. 16(b)(7)2 means it did not need to provide a more comprehensive disclosure 
because Dr. Friedman's ultimate testimony went beyond the scope of the defense's 
pretrial disclosers. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Since by the State's own admission (Resp. 
Br., p.7), the prosecutor was intending to use Dr. McPherson's opinions to rebut the 
opinions Dr. Friedman's had disclosed pretrial, the rebuttal provision of !.C.R. 16(b)(7) is 
2 The rebuttal provision of I.C.R. 16(b)(7) provides: "This subsection does not require 
disclosure of expert witnesses, their opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, or 
the witness's qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories that have not 
been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial." 
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inapplicable in this case. Thus, the State was required to disclose Dr. McPherson's 
opinions under the primary provision of I CR. 16(b)(7). 
The fact that the State's concession clearly shows the error also means, 
regardless of whether the disclosure in this case was more like the insufficient 
disclosure in State v. Morin, 158 Idaho 622, 626 (Ct App. 2015), rev. denied June 22, 
2015, or more like the sufficient disclosure in State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 93-94 (2014), 
this Court should still vacate Mr. Ruiz's conviction. Nevertheless, the State's argument 
regarding the applicability of Morin to this case - because there were more specific 
subtopics identified in the disclosure, the disclosure was sufficient (see Resp. Br., p.8) -
is erroneous. 
Although the prosecutor's disclosure in this case, unlike the disclosure in Morin, 
identified specific subtopics upon which the State anticipated Dr. McPherson to testify, it 
still did not provide the same sort of specifics about the opinion the prosecutor expected 
Dr. McPherson to give, as was the case in Koch. (See App. Br., pp 10-13 (discussing 
the distinction between Koch and Morin in depth).) Thus, the disclosure still failed to 
disclose what Dr. McPherson's opinion would actually be; all it did was identify the 
general issues and subtopics to which he might speak during his testimony. That is the 
same shortcoming which rendered the disclosures in Morin insufficient. See Morin, 158 
Idaho at 626. It certainly did not serve the goals of the discovery rules - "to 'promote 
fairness and candor,' 'facilitate fair and expedient pretrial fact gathering,' and 'prevent 
surprise at trial."' Id. (quoting Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873-78 (2006)). That 
means, despite identifying specific subtopics potentially up for discussion, the disclosure 
was still insufficient under the rules. 
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Ultimately, the State was required to make a full, sufficient disclosure of 
McPherson's opinions and the facts and data upon which those opinions were 
based prior to trial. I.C.R. 16(b)(7). Since Dr. McPherson was the only person 
competent to say what his opinions were and how he came to those opinions, the State 
needed to disclose a report by Dr. McPherson with that information. However, the State 
failed to present any such information, particularly regarding Dr. McPherson's proposed 
testimony to rebut Dr. Friedman's opinions. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, but 
particularly because of the State's concession of the due process violation, allowing 
Dr. McPherson to testify as an expert witness in rebuttal was error. 
B. The State Has Failed To Prove This Error Harmless Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt 
When there is objected-to error, the State bears the burden of proving that error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) 
(establishing the harmless error test); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) 
(reaffirming that Idaho applies the Chapman test when assessing objected-to error). 
This means the State must show there is not a reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the verdict actually rendered. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 
(1993); State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919 (2015) (reaffirming that Sullivan's 
interpretation of Chapman is proper in Idaho). Since Mr. Ruiz objected to 
Dr. McPherson's testimony (see, e.g., Tr., p.666, Ls.14-19), the State must meet this 
standard. However, the State simply asserts the error was harmless without any 
analysis in that regard. (See Resp. Br., p.10.) That is insufficient to meet its burden 
7 
under the harmless error test. Compare State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 
(2013). 
At any rate, the State admits that Dr. McPherson's testimony was simply to 
emphasize the significance of J.A.'s injuries, and so, "was largely cumulative with the 
previously unchallenged testimony of Ann Guzman." (Resp. Br., p.9.) Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403 specifically prohibits the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence," 
precisely because it creates a danger of unfair prejudice. The reason for such a rule 
has been succinctly summarized by the Minnesota Court of Appeals: it "tends to 
highlight and isolate one portion of the trial evidence, thus inviting, perhaps 
encouraging, undue emphasis on that portion" of the evidence. State v. Wembley, 712 
N.W.2d 783, 790 (Minn. Ct App. 2006). In essence, it tends to vouch for the credibility 
of the already-presented evidence, encouraging the jury to decide on only that 
evidence, rather than considering all the evidence presented. See id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such evidence is not properly presented to the 
jury: "we have held that 'expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the 
credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to 
make credibility determinations, and therefore, does not 'assist the trier of fact' as 
required by [I.R.E.] 702"'. Perry, 150 Idaho at 229 (quoting State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 
520, 525 (2003) (quoting United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 
1999))). Thus, the State's concession that Dr. McPherson's testimony was merely 
cumulative to Ms. Guzman's testimony affirmatively disproves its unsupported assertion 
that the error in admitting Dr. McPherson's testimony was harmless. 
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Furthermore, the failure to provide an expert's report as required by the discovery 
rules presents a separate and distinct harm that is not related to the actual, substantive 
testimony the expert gives. Instead, it centers on the defense's ability to meet the 
expert's testimony, and it constitutes a separate violation of the defendant's right to due 
process. See, e.g., Wardius, 412 U.S at 474. Specifically, when a party does not 
comply with !.C.R. 16(b)(7), opposing counsel is deprived of the ability to prepare for 
and adequately challenge the expert's testimony on cross examination. See Wardius, 
412 U.S. at 474 (explaining that "the ends of justice will be best served by a system of 
liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information 
with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at 
trial.") Defense counsel actually invoked this rationale before the district court, arguing 
that without the adequate discovery, he would not be able to adequately challenge 
Dr. McPherson's testimony at trial. (R., Vol.2, p.215.) That means there is a 
reasonable possibility the jury convicted Mr. Ruiz based on Dr. McPherson's testimony, 
which the defense was unable to adequately challenge at trial because of the discovery 
violation. As discussed in depth in Section l(A)(1 ), supra. the State does not challenge 
Mr. Ruiz's analysis on the due process issue. Thus, by not offering any argument 
against this independent harm, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove the 
discovery error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Since the State has not met its burden under the harmless error test, this 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ruiz's Motion To Dismiss The Indictment 
Even Though The Indictment Omitted An Essential Element Of The Offense 
The State concedes that the indictment failed to allege an essential element of 
the crime charged - the mens rea element of "willfully." (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, it 
disputes the applicable standard of review in this case, arguing that the challenges 
defense counsel addressed in his motion to dismiss the indictment did not raise this 
particular jurisdictional challenge, and so. the more liberal standard of review should 
apply. 3 (Resp. Br., pp.11-14.) Arguing under the more liberal standard, the State 
contends the district court's decision to not dismiss the indictment was appropriate. 
(Resp. Br. pp.11-14.) The State is mistaken in all respects, but particularly regarding 
the applicable standard of review. Mr. Ruiz raised his jurisdictional challenge pretrial, 
and so, this case should be analyzed under the stricter standard of review, though the 
district court's decision is erroneous under the more liberal standard, too. 
A. This Claim Is Properly Analyzed Under The Stricter Standard Of Review 
The State's argument for the more liberal standard of review hinges on the idea 
that, because defense counsel did not expressly state that he was making a 
3 The Court of Appeals has identified the relevant standards of review as follows: 
A charging document will be deemed so flawed that it fails to confer 
jurisdiction on the court ... if the document fails to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a 
defendant before trial or the entry of a guilty plea, the charging document 
must state all facts essential to establish the charged offense, but if the 
information is not challenged until after a verdict or guilty plea, it will be 
liberally construed in favor of validity .... 
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jurisdictional challenge, his pretrial challenges to the indictment were not sufficient to 
preserve a jurisdiction challenge for appeal (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, the State 
acknowledges that Mr. Ruiz challenged the indictment as insufficient because it failed to 
allege the essential elements of the charge with sufficient particularity and did not 
charge the commission of an actual crime under the statute. (Resp. Br., p.13 n.4.) That 
concession, which the State attempts to downplay in a footnote, is actually critical, given 
the way the courts have interpreted the scope of jurisdictional challenges. 
For example, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that ·'an indictment is 
"jurisdictionally defective" when it "fail[s] to allege a material fact essential to establish 
the offense for which [the defendant] was charged." State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 621, 
624 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis from original). Thus, by arguing "the indictment ... fails 
to set forth properly and with the requisite definiteness and particularity a// the essential 
elements of the crimes attempted to be charged," (R., Vol.1, p.55 (emphasis added)), 
defense counsel, ipso facto, raised a jurisdictional challenge. See Byington, 135 Idaho 
624; McNair, 141 Idaho at 268. The State's argument to the contrary, demanding that 
the defendant must expressly state that his challenge is jurisdictional, only serves to 
improperly promote form over substance. See, e.g., State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 
355 (2003) (quoting Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237 (1969) (reiterating that 
'"[s]ubstance not form governs."') As a result, this case is properly assessed under the 
stricter standard of review because Mr. Ruiz raised his jurisdictional challenge to the 
indictment pretrial. 
State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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B. Under The Stricter Standard Of Review. The Indictment In Mr. Ruiz's Case Was 
Jurisdictionally Defective 
The State's concession that the mens rea element "willfully" was not in the 
indictment (Resp. Br., p.13) is sufficient to show the indictment failed to convey 
jurisdiction under the stricter standard of review, since that means the indictment failed 
to allege a material fact essential to establish the offense charged. See, Byington, 135 
Idaho at 624. However, the State asserts in a footnote that, under the stricter standard 
of review, the indictment should be deemed sufficient because there is no requirement 
for willfulness when the injury to child charge alleges actual infliction of injury. (Resp. 
Br., p.14 n.5.) That assertion flies in the face of clear Idaho Supreme Court precedent, 
which holds, "[a] plain reading of section 18-1501(1) indicates that its purpose is to 
punish conduct or inaction that intentionally causes a child to suffer." State v. Young, 
138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Supreme Court, 
"Section 18-1501(1) tells the jury that the State must prove that [the defendant] willfully 
caused or permitted the child to suffer or inflicted unjustifiable physical pain." Id. 
(emphasis added). Thus, by the Supreme Court's clear explanation, the "willfully" mens 
rea element applies to all the different articulations of how a person might violate 
I.C. § 18-1501 (1 ). 
Reading the statute as the State does in footnote 5 results in precisely what the 
Supreme Court determined the plain language of that statute does not allow: it subjects 
parents and guardians "to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out 
poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment." Young, 138 Idaho at 373. Under the State's 
reading of the statute, a parent or guardian who uses certain disciplinary tactics, even 
though not intending to injure the child, could be prosecuted simply because an injury 
12 
occurred and regardless of whether they were aware those tactics could be harmful the 
child. That position has already been expressly rejected: "This definition [of willfully] 
encompasses more than performing some act or omissions purposefully .... [T]he fact 
that a child is ultimately injured or endangered is, by itself, insufficient to convict." 
State v. Gonzales, 158 Idaho 112, 119 (Ct. App. 2015); cf Young, 138 Idaho at 373. 
The State's reading of the statute is particularly problematic in cases like this one, 
where the parent had used those tactics on prior occasions without the disastrous 
consequences, and so, would be even less likely to have the requisite mens rea. (See 
App. Br., p.31.) As the Supreme Court noted: "Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) is a 
criminal statute not a barometer for stupidity." Id. Therefore, the State's contention that 
the willfulness element does not apply to the particular mechanism by which the offense 
was charged in this case is meritless. 
Thus, the grand jury needed to be instructed on, and subsequently find probable 
cause of, the specific statutory element of "willfully," applicable to all the iterations of 
how that statute might be violated. When the State failed to ensure that happened, (see 
R., pp.20-21 (the complaint presented to the grand jury failing to include the willfulness 
element); Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.21, L.6 (the prosecutor's discussion of the elements with the 
grand jury failing in the same regard)), the resulting indictment did not include all the 
essential elements of the charge under the plain, unambiguous language of the 
controlling statute. See Young, 138 Idaho at 373. As the State has not argued that 
there is good reason (and there is none) to ignore stare decisis and overrule Young, 
Young controls. 
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Ultimately, under the stricter standard of review, the mens rea element of "willful" 
is an essential element of the offense regardless of which articulation of the violation is 
charged under I.C. § 18-1501(1). As a result, the indictment's failure to include that 
essential element, based on the fact that the prosecutor did not instruct the grand jury 
on that element, means the indictment is jurisdictionally defective under the stricter 
standard of review. 
C. Even Under The More Liberal Standard Of Review, The Indictment Should Have 
Been Vacated 
Even if the State is correct and the more liberal standard of review applies in this 
case, this Court should still vacate the conviction. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 237 (1987), a defendant may 
challenge the validity of a grand jury's indictment even after jury trial if the defendant is 
able to show prejudice flowing from that error in the grand jury proceedings. Compare 
State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 620 (2005) (considering only a notice issue vis-a-vis a 
prosecutor's Information following the opportunity for a preliminary hearing); 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 756 (2004) (same). Such prejudice exists in this case 
because the grand jury was not asked to find probable cause on one of the essential 
elements of the offense. (See R., pp.20-21; Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.21, L.6.) As discussed in 
depth in the Appellant's Brief, pp 16-18, this means prejudice resulted from this error in 
the grand jury proceedings. The State has not responded to Mr. Ruiz's argument in that 
regard. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
Since this case is controlled by Edmonson, and thus, is distinguishable from 
Jones and Quintero, even if this case is assessed under the more liberal standard of 
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review, Mr. Ruiz is still entitled to relief for the prejudice resulting from the tainted grand 
jury proceedings. 
111. 
The District Court Erroneously Allowed The State To Present Evidence Of Other Bad 
Acts Even Though The State Did Not Serve Timely Notice Pursuant To I.R.E. 404(b) 
A. Mr. Ruiz's Challenge To The Timeliness Of The Disclosure Is Not Moot 
The State contends that, because the district court did not expressly rule on the 
admissibility of the evidence of prior bad acts, Mr. Ruiz's challenge to the State's late 
notice of its intent to introduce evidence of other bad acts is moot. (Resp. Br., 
pp.15-17.) The State is mistaken. The district court ultimately allowed the State to 
present various evidence of other bad acts, and so, it implicitly found that evidence to 
be admissible. See, e.g., State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 627 (1986) (acknowledging 
that the district court can make implicitly rulings); see also City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 
154 Idaho 425, 444 (2013) (holding that, when the district court does not make express 
findings of fact, "we consider whether the district court made implicit factual findings"). 
This is particularly problematic since the prosecutor subsequently argued that evidence 
solely for propensity purposes: "This isn't an isolated event. This isn't a one-time 
event. Ladies and gentlemen, when it happens over and over, it becomes routine. It 
becomes a pattern. It becomes routine child abuse." (Tr., p.781, Ls.7-11.) As such, 
the record demonstrates the evidence of other bad acts was admitted against Mr. Ruiz. 
That is problematic because the notice requirement of I.R.E. 404(b) is a 
"condition precedent to admission of other acts evidence " State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 
225, 227-28 (2008). Since the State failed to comply with the mandatory requirements 
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of I.RE. 404(b) - namely to file notice of its intent to use that information reasonably in 
advance of trial - it should have been precluded from presenting that evidence at a II. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230 ("Because the State failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of I.RE. 404(b), Sheldon's statements were inadmissible."). 
Since the evidence of the other bad acts should not have been admitted because 
the State failed to meet that requirement, Mr. Ruiz's challenge to the timeliness of the 
State's notice was well-founded. Relief, namely the conviction being vacated because 
of the improper presentation of, and argument on, that evidence, is available. Compare 
id. Since relief for an error by the district court is available, this issue is not moot. See, 
e.g., State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682 (2004) ("Justiciable issues are controversies 
that are real and substantial and can be concluded through the grant of relief by a 
court.") 
B. Since The Relevant Question Is Whether The Defendant Knew Of The State's 
Intent To Introduce The Evidence Of Other Bad Acts, Not Simply Whether The 
Defendant Knew That Evidence Existed, The Late Notice Prejudiced Mr. Ruiz 
On appeal, the State makes no attempt to justify why the prosecutor waited until 
the day before trial to file her notice pursuant to I.RE. 404(b). (See generally Resp. Br.) 
Nor does it address the fact that the prosecutor below relied on the evidence of other 
bad acts it was allowed to present expressly for propensity purposes in her closing 
argument. (See generally Resp. Br.) Instead, it simply argues that, because Mr. Ruiz 
was aware evidence of other bad acts existed, he was not prejudiced by the State's late 
notice of its intent to use that evidence at his trial. (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) In making that 
argument, the State does not address the fact that the information the prosecutor 
presented to the district court disproves that argument. (See App. Br., p.22 (discussing 
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the unpublished decision in State v. McHale, which the prosecutor submitted for the 
district court's consideration)4; see generally Resp. Br.) 
The State's argument on appeal, like the prosecutor's argument before it, is 
erroneous. Besides the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent to the 
contrary, the plain language of the rule itself disproves the State's argument: "the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice ... of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." I.RE. 404(b) (emphasis added). Thus, 
the prejudice caused by a late notice does not arise from defendant's lack of knowledge 
about the existence of the evidence the State wants to use; it arises from the 
defendant's lack of knowledge of the State's intent to present that otherwise-
inadmissible evidence at trial. See I.RE. 404(b); Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230 (reaffirming 
that the purpose of the notice requirement is "to reduce surprise and promote early 
resolution on the issue of admissibility."). For example, when the defendant is deprived 
of adequate notice of the State's intent to introduce that evidence at trial, he cannot 
adequately prepare a challenge to the admissibility of that evidence nor can he 
adequately formulate a trial strategy to address that evidence. State v. Naranjo, 152 
Idaho 134, 142 (Ct. App. 2011) (vacating a conviction that was based on evidence of 
4 Mr. Ruiz recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he 
does not cite McHale as authority for a particular decision in this case. Rather, he, like 
the prosecutor below, merely references the McHale decision as a historical example of 
how a learned court has analyzed the question of adequate notice under I.R.E. 404(b). 
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) 
(quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991 )) ("When this Court had cause 
to consider unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had 
discussed the cases in his petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished 
opinions as 'quite appropriat[e].' Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of 
the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example, was 
appropriate."). 
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other bad acts admitted without proper notice under I.R.E. 404(b) because the 
defendant "was prejudiced in his ability to prepare and defendant against the prior drug 
purchase evidence"). Therefore, the State's late disclosure in this case was just as 
problematic as it was in Naranjo. 
The State's closing argument actually highlights the prejudice allowing this 
evidence to be admitted on the late notice caused in Mr. Ruiz's case. The prosecutor, 
Erica Kallin, argued the evidence of other bad acts solely as propensity evidence: "This 
isn't an isolated event This isn't a one-time event Ladies and gentlemen, when it 
happens over and over, it becomes routine. It becomes a pattern. It becomes routine 
child abuse." (Tr., p.781, Ls.7-11.) The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly 
condemned precisely this sort of argument: "The unstated premise in Moore[5] is simply 
this: 'if he did it before, he probably did it this time as well.' This complete reliance 
upon propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49. 54 (2009). Thus, the fact that the State was 
allowed to present the evidence of other bad acts, and then expressly argue it for 
propensity, based on its late notice shows that Mr. Ruiz was, indeed. prejudiced by the 
late notice. Compare Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230 ("Because the State failed to comply 
with the notice provisions of I.R.E. 404(b), Sheldon's statements were inadmissible."). 
Therefore, the State's contention that the notice was sufficient, which is contrary 
to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, Court of Appeals precedent, and the plain language 
of the rule itself, should be rejected. 
5 State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743 (1991). 
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C. The Error Was Not Harmless 
The State contends the erroneous admission of the evidence of other bad acts 
on the late notice was harmless because it was "relatively sparse and insignificant 
compared to evidence [of guilt]". (Resp. Br., p.20.) Essentially, the State is asking 
this Court to sit a thirteenth juror and weigh all the other evidence in this case absent 
the error, so as to reach its own conclusion about Mr. Ruiz's guilt or innocence. 
(See Resp. Br., p.20.) "It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do not 
reweigh evidence." State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842 (2007). '"[N]or are we concerned 
with what decision we would have made had we been the trier of fact."' Fife v. Home 
Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509,514 (2011) (quoting Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 
Idaho 79, 81 (2001)) (specifically discussing the proper standard for appellate review of 
a decision by the Industrial Commission). Thus, the State's invitation for this Court to 
reweigh the evidence absent the error as its harmless error analysis is improper. 
The United States Supreme Court has made this point eminently clear: "the 
question [the harmless error test] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what 
effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable 
jury, but rather, what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand." Sullivan, 
508 U.S. at 279; cf Thomas, 157 Idaho at 919 (reaffirming Sullivan's interpretation is 
the proper analysis in Idaho). Thus, the harmless error analysis must focus on "the 
basis on which 'the jury actually rested its verdict."' Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 
U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan). 'The inquiry, in other words, is not 
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
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unattributable to the error. Id. (emphasis from original). "That must be so," the 
Supreme Court concluded, "because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in 
fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might 
be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee." Id. (emphasis added). The proper question, 
then, is whether the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous 
admission of the other bad acts evidence did not contribute to the verdict. Id.; Perry, 
150 Idaho at 222 (reaffirming this as the standard for addressing objected-to error). 
It is not actually possible for the State to meet that burden on this issue, given the 
facts of this case. The prosecutor actually argued the other bad acts evidence solely for 
propensity purposes, not one of the permissible alternative uses. (See Tr., p.781, 
Ls. 7-11.) Since the prosecutor expressly asked the jury to draw exactly the sort of 
conclusion which is prohibited by the rule, there is far more than the necessary 
reasonable possibility that the introduction of the evidence of other bad acts contributed 
to the verdict in this case. Therefore, the State has failed to meet its burden to prove 
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV. 
The District Court Made An Impermissible Comment On The Evidence, That One Of 
The Elements Of The Offense Would Be "Quite Obvious" From The Prosecutor's 
Evidence 
The State acknowledges that, under the first prong of the fundamental error 
analysis, if the district court improperly commented on the evidence, that would violate 
Mr. Ruiz's constitutional rights. ( See Resp. Br., p.27.) As such, its arguments on this 
issue focus on the second and third prongs of the fundamental error analysis. Its 
arguments in both respects are meritless. 
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A. The Error From District Court's Improper Comment Is Clear From The Record 
On the second prong of the fundamental error analysis, the State contends the 
error is not clear from the record because it believes the district court judge was just 
ruling on a foundational objection when it said, "I think from everything, it's going to be 
quite obvious." (Resp. Br., p.23.) In fact, based on that conclusion, it asserts the 
judge's comment was not an error at all. (Resp. Br., p.23.) The State's argument is 
erroneous for several reasons. 
The first premise of the State's argument - that the objection was merely 
foundational - is erroneous because the actual objection defense counsel made was 
substantive. It asserted the prosecutor's question - whether Mr. Ruiz's alleged actions 
were "extremely painful for [J.A.]" - improperly "calls for a conclusion from this --
[prosecutor talking over defense counsel] -- of a nonexpert witness." (Tr., p.335, 
Ls.2-9.) Regardless of whether the prosecutor could have laid more foundation, 
defense counsel's objection contended the witness could not ever give a proper opinion 
as to whether J.A. was experiencing extreme pain at that time; it would always be an 
improper lay opinion. Therefore, the record is clear that defense counsel raised a 
substantive objection to the evidence called for by the question the prosecutor asked. 
And since defense counsel's objection was not foundational, the district court's ruling on 
that objection could not properly be merely foundational. 
The context of the question objected to also disproves the second premise of the 
State's argument - that, when the district court said "it's going to be quite obvious," the 
term "it" referred to the foundation for the witness's answer. The question the judge was 
considering dealt with whether J.A. was experiencing extreme pain, and to that point, it 
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said. 'Tm sure that Ms. Kallin will describe everything [J.A.] said. I think from 
everything it's going to be quite obvious." (Tr., p.335, Ls.2-13.) Since the district court 
was referring to the contents of J.A.'s anticipated testimony about the alleged pain, the 
record is clear the term "it" is referring to the topic being discussed - whether, as a 
matter of fact, J.A. experienced extreme pain. 
Thus, the State's interpretation of the context of the objection and the district 
court's ensuing statement is not reasonable and is disproved by the record. As such, 
Mr. Ruiz is not arguing the most damaging of several different interpretations of that 
statement (see Resp. Br., p.23); he is arguing the only reasonable interpretation of the 
judge's comments, given the actual question asked and objection raised, is improper 
under established precedent. (See App. Br., pp.25-26.) Assessing the district court's 
comment under the proper standards, the error remains clear from the face of the 
record 
And even if the State were correct and the district court was simply ruling that the 
testimony could be admissible with more foundation, that would mean the district court 
made a separate and distinct error by improperly overruling a valid objection to the 
inadmissible lay witness opinion to come in. See, e.g., I.RE. 701. "[W]hen the question 
is one which can be decided by persons of ordinary experience and knowledge, it is for 
the trier of fact to decide[;]" lay witness opinions on such questions are inadmissible. 
State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 632-33 (Ct App. 2001 ). The question to which defense 
counsel objected - whether Mr. Ruiz's alleged actions caused J.A. extreme pain - is a 
question which can be answered by persons of ordinary experience and knowledge 
looking at the surrounding facts. Therefore, it was for the jury to weigh "the truth of the 
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facts presented by the witnesses and draw its conclusions by the exercise of 
independent judgment and reasoning powers, without hearing the opinions of the 
witnesses." State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 855 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Thus, if the district 
court were ruling that the lay opinion could come in if more foundation were laid, that 
would constitute a separate, objected-to error, which would demand relief either by itself 
or when accumulated with the other errors in this case. In either case, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Ruiz's conviction. 
B. Mr. Ruiz Has Shown The A Reasonable Possibility That The District Court's 
Improper Comment Affected The Verdict In This Case 
As to the third prong of the fundamental error analysis, the State contends that 
there is no harm from the district court's comment on the evidence because the generic 
pre-proof instruction given by the district court some hours before the improper 
comment was sufficient to cure all the harm caused by the judge's improper comment 
on the evidence. (Resp. Br., p.23.) Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the State's 
argument would preclude the appellate courts from reviewing any improper comment 
made by the district court during trial. The State's argument is mistaken. 
Rather, while there may be a presumption that the jurors follow instructions 
given, Idaho's courts have recognized that "application of th[at] presumption does not 
always end the inquiry." State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2012); cf. 
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978) (finding that, given the prejudicial nature of 
the error, "the presumption of the efficaciousness of cautionary warnings" was 
overcome). The Watkins Court explained the reasoning behind this rule: "although we 
normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible 
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evidence, this presumption cannot shield all errors from appellate review, regardless of 
the severity of the error or the forcefulness and effectiveness of the instruction. Id. 
That conclusion is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, which 
provides: "there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, 
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, 
that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); cf. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 
171 (1994) (reaffirming Bruton on this point). 
To that end, the Watkins Court identified factors which can show the presumption 
should not apply: whether the error is particularly prejudicial, and whether the 
instruction would sufficiently nullify that prejudice. Id. As to the first of those factors, the 
error in this case is particularly problematic. As the Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained, "[r]emarks or comments by a trial judge which would tend to prejudice either 
of the parties to a jury trial are proscribed because of the great possibility that such an 
expression will influence the jurors." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 711-12 (1976). 
Precisely because it is the judge who is making the comment, there is a great possibility 
that the comment will influence jurors regardless of an instruction to the contrary. See 
id. As such, the first factor identified in Watkins indicates the presumption should not 
apply in this case. 
Similarly, the nature of the instruction itself reveals it to be insufficient to cure that 
particularly problematic harm. For example, "where improper testimony is inadvertently 
introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury it disregard such 
evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." 
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State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, 545 (Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added); cf 
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). The instruction upon 
which the State would rely preceded the improper comment by several hours. 
(R., Vol.1, pp.170-71 (minutes of the trial noting the reading of the preliminary 
instructions and the testimony of the witness in question); R., Vol.2, p.189 (the 
instruction to disregard in the pre-proof instructions).) Thus, the fact that there was no 
prompt instruction following the error indicates the presumption does not apply. 
Compare Keyes, 150 Idaho at 545 (holding no mistrial was necessary due in part to the 
fact that "the district court gave the jury an immediate and forceful curative instruction."); 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498-99 (holding such an error harmless because immediately 
after ruling upon the issue, the district court gave a sufficient curative instruction). 
Furthermore, there are some cases where even a prompt instruction might not be 
enough: "a corrective instruction, even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to cure 
the prejudicial effect of the improper opinion [or statement]." Keyes, 150 Idaho at 545; 
cf Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768 (reaffirming Keyes on this point). The instruction upon 
which the State would rely is generic: "if any expression of mine seems to indicate an 
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it" (R., p.189.) As 
such, it is not nearly forceful enough to repel the "great possibility" of prejudice which 
flowed from the judge's improper comment that two of the essential elements of the 
charge would be "quite obvious" from all the evidence the prosecutor would 
subsequently present. See White, 97 Idaho at 711-12. As such, the second factor 
identified in Watkins - the ability of the instruction given to actually nullify the prejudice 
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from the improper comment - also demonstrates why the presumption does not apply in 
this case. 
Thus, as in Watkins, the facts reveal the presumption is not properly applied in 
this case. Therefore, this Court should evaluate whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the verdict in this case. Compare, e.g. Watkins, 152 
Idaho at 768 (explaining that, when the presumption does not apply, the proper 
approach is to evaluate the case for harmless error).6 
The State does not offer any additional argument in on the merits of Mr. Ruiz's 
prejudice argument as it ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in White entirely. 
(See generally Resp. Br., pp.23-24.) Since the Supreme Court held in White that a 
judge's improper comments on elements of the offense charged presents "the great 
possibility that such an expression will influence the jurors," White, 97 Idaho at 711-12, 
there is a reasonable possibility that the judge's comment affected the verdict in this 
case. (See App. Br., pp.26-27 (detailing the information which shows Mr. Ruiz met the 
third prong of the Perry test on this issue).) Therefore, Mr. Ruiz has met his burden 
under the third prong of the fundamental error analysis. 
As such, this Court should vacate the conviction based on the fundamental error 
caused by the district court's improper comment on the evidence. 
6 Of course, since Mr. Ruiz has raised this claim as fundamental error, he bears the 
burden of proving prejudice in the harmless error analysis on this issue. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226. 
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V, 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Both Vair Dire And Closing Argument By 
Misstating The Law And Lowering The State's Burden Of Proof By Arguing That There 
Was No Mens Rea Requirement Associated With A Charge Of Injury To A Child 
As with the district court's improper comment, the State acknowledges that, if the 
prosecutor did commit misconduct, that would violate Mr. Ruiz's constitutional rights. 
(Resp. Br., pp.25-26.) As such, its arguments on this issue also focus on the second 
and third prongs of the fundamental error analysis. None of its arguments are 
persuasive. 
A. The Prosecutor's Misconduct Is Clear From The Record 
On the second prong of the fundamental error analysis, the State's argument that 
the error is not clear from the record fails to acknowledge, much less appreciate, the 
fact that the "willfully" element the State must prove in a prosecution for injury to child is 
different than in other prosecutions involving that mens rea element. ( See generally 
Resp. Br., pp.24-30.) As a result of that failure, both in regard to the prosecutor's 
statements in voir dire and in closing argument, the State contends there is no clear 
error based on its belief that the prosecutor could properly argue that, while the 
defendant did not intend the injury, he did intend the act, and that is sufficient to justify 
the conviction. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.24-30.) The State's contention is 
erroneous. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have made it eminently 
clear that the plain language of I.C. § 18-1501(1) sets a different level of proof for the 
State than other, similar statutes - merely performing some act or omission purposefully 
is not enough to convict under I.C. § 18-1501(1), nor is the mere fact that the child is 
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injured. State v. Gonzales, 158 Idaho 112,119 (Ct. App. 2015). Rather, the State must 
prove that the defendant intended to act while aware of the possibility that his actions 
would result in injury to or endangerment of the child. Id.; cf. Young, 138 Idaho at 37 3; 
State v. Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho 165, 169 (Ct. App. 2003). The prosecutor's 
statements, as the State argues them on appeal, falls short of that standard. 
That is because the State's argument on appeal - while he did not intend to 
injury, he intended to act, and that is sufficient - still fails to incorporate the mens rea 
element the State must prove - that he acted while aware of the dangerousness of his 
actions. See, e.g., Young, 138 Idaho at 373. Thus, the State's argument on appeal is 
erroneous because, as discussed in Section 11(8), supra, it would allow a parent or 
guardian who uses certain disciplinary tactics, even though not intending to injure the 
child, to be prosecuted regardless of whether they were aware those tactics could be 
harmful the child That is particularly problematic in cases like this one, where the 
parent had used those tactics on prior occasions without the disastrous consequences, 
and so, would be even less likely to have the requisite mens rea. (See App. Br., p.31.) 
As the Supreme Court explained: "Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) is a criminal statute 
not a barometer for stupidity." Young, 138 Idaho at 373 Thus, the statute cannot be 
argued so broadly as to criminalize "good faith decisions that turn out poorly-innocent 
mistakes of judgment." Id. 
Yet that is precisely what the State is arguing for on appeal It contends the 
prosecutor can convince jurors in voir dire to set aside concerns about regulating 
discipline because that's not what is required under the law; it is just the act itself which 
is criminalized. (See Resp. Br., p.27.) It contends that the prosecutor can argue it was 
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enough for the State to prove that, even though the defendant did not intend for the 
child "to be injured like that," he intended the act and that is enough to convict. 
(Resp. Br., p.29.) Mr. Ruiz's argument against those statements is not calling for this 
Court to adopt the most damaging of several reasonable views of those statements 
(see Resp. Br., p.29); it is calling for this Court to reject those statements, as Young and 
its progeny have already held such statements to be improper under the plain language 
of the controlling statute. 
Since the State's arguments on the second prong of the fundamental error 
analysis fail to comport with clear, established precedent, this Court should reject the 
State's arguments. Thus, the prosecutor's comments in voir dire and closing, subjected 
to evaluation under the prosper standard, "misled the jury about the mental element of 
the offense of injury to a child," Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169, and so, constituted error 
clear from the face of the record. (App. Br., pp.28-31.) 
B. Mr. Ruiz Has Shown A Reasonable Possibility The Prosecutor's Misconduct 
Affected The Verdict In This Case 
In arguing under the third prong of Perry on this issue, the State does not 
acknowledge the fact that one of the jurors who actually deliberated on this case had 
been persuaded to the prosecutor's erroneous view of the burden of proof. (See 
generally Resp. Br., pp.24-30.) After being subjected to the prosecutor's improper voir 
dire on this point, Juror 390 affirmed that "the fact that it was done, if you could prove 
that it was done, then that would be enough." (Tr., p.190, Ls.1-2.) However, Idaho's 
courts have held that is not the case: ''This definition [of willfully] encompasses more 
than performing some act or omissions purposefully .... [T]he fact that a child is 
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ultimately injured or endangered is, by itself, insufficient to convict" Gonzales, 158 
Idaho at 119; cf Young, 138 Idaho at 373. Therefore, the fact that one of the twelve 
jurors who deliberated on this case expressly felt that "the fact that it was done, would 
be sufficient to convict Mr. Ruiz, shows the reasonable possibility the prosecutor's 
misstatement of the burden of proof contributed to the verdict - a conviction based on 
less than the required level of proof. Therefore, Mr. Ruiz has met his burden under the 
third prong of Perry. 
Rather than address Juror 390's statement, the State simply argues that, "[i]n 
light of the strength of the state's evidence of [Mr.] Ruiz's guilt," it was the State's belief 
that Mr. Ruiz did not meet his burden under Perry. (Resp. Br., p.30.) However, Perry 
makes it clear that the relevant analysis to this prong of the fundamental error test is the 
harmless error test: "an appellate court shall review the error under the harmless error 
test, with the defendant bearing the burden of [proof] . . ." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 
(emphasis added). As has been discussed in depth in Section lll(C), supra, the State's 
argument, based on the purported strength of the other evidence in the record, is asking 
the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, and such an argument has no place in the 
harmless error analysis. Since Perry applies the harmless error analysis (with a flipped 
burden of proof), the State's arguments have no place under the Perry analysis either. 
Therefore, the State's argument on the third prong of the Perry test, which is 
contrary to both the facts of the case and the relevant law, should be disregarded. 
Applying the proper standards, Mr. Ruiz has shown there is a reasonable possibility the 
prosecutor's misstatement of the State's burden of proof contributed to the verdict, and 
so, constitutes fundamental error. 
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VI. 
The Accumulated Errors In This Case Require Reversal Even If This Court Determines 
Them To Be Individually Harmless 
The State makes two brief points in regard to the application of the cumulative 
error doctrine in this case. First, it reasserts its belief that there were no errors in this 
case. (Resp. Br., p.31.) However, as demonstrated supra, the State is mistaken in that 
belief. There were at least five errors, at least three of which were objected to. 
Therefore, there are more than enough errors to accumulate, and when assessed 
together, they show Mr. Ruiz was denied his right to a fair trial. (See App. Br., pp.31-33 
(discussing the application of the cumulative error doctrine in detail).) 
The other contention the State makes is that, "given the weight of the evidence 
presented that [Mr.] Ruiz was guilty of felony injury to child, any errors [were harmless]." 
(Resp. Br., p.31.) That argument is erroneous because it fails to appreciate the fact that 
the cumulative error doctrine applies the harmless error analysis. See, e.g., 
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 953 (Ct. App. 2012) (applying the harmless error 
test's rationale while evaluating a case for cumulative error). Therefore, the State bears 
the burden to prove the accumulation of errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As discussed in depth in 
Section lll(C), supra, the State's argument, based on the purported strength of the other 
evidence in the record, is asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, and such 
an argument has no place in the proper application of the harmless error analysis. 
Since the cumulative error analysis applies the harmless error analysis, the State's 
argument has no place in the cumulative error analysis either. Therefore, this Court 
should disregard the State's improper argument to that effect. 
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Thus, even if all the errors discussed supra are independently harmless, the 
accumulation of those errors (at least those followed by a contemporaneous objection) 
reveal this Court should vacate Mr. Ruiz's convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ruiz respectfully requests that th is 
Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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